MTU Library Catalogue

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A course in game theory / Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein.

By: Osborne, Martin J.
Contributor(s): Rubinstein, Ariel.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1994Description: xv, 352 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. + pbk.ISBN: 0262150417; 0262650401.Subject(s): Game theoryDDC classification: 519.3
Contents:
Introduction -- I: Strategic games -- II: Extensive games with perfect information -- III: Extensive games with imperfect information -- IV: Coalition games.

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

This text presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 321-339) and index.

Introduction -- I: Strategic games -- II: Extensive games with perfect information -- III: Extensive games with imperfect information -- IV: Coalition games.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

  • Preface (p. xi)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 1)
  • I Strategic Games
  • 2 Nash Equilibrium (p. 11)
  • 3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibruim (p. 31)
  • 4 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions (p. 53)
  • 5 Knowledge and Equilibrium (p. 67)
  • II Extensive Games with Perfect Information
  • 6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information (p. 89)
  • 7 Bargaining Games (p. 117)
  • 8 Repeated Games (p. 133)
  • 9 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games (p. 163)
  • 10 Implementation Theory (p. 177)
  • III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
  • 11 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information (p. 199)
  • 12 Sequential Equilibrium (p. 219)
  • IV Coalitional Games
  • 13 The Core (p. 257)
  • 14 Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value (p. 277)
  • 15 The Nash Solution (p. 299)
  • List of Results (p. 313)
  • References (p. 321)
  • Index (p. 341)