MTU Library Catalogue

Handbook of game theory with economic applications. vol. 1 / edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart.

Contributor(s): Aumann, Robert J | Hart, Sergiu.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Handbooks in economics: bk. 11.Publisher: Amsterdam ; New York : New York, N.Y., USA : North-Holland, Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co., 1992 (1999)Description: xxvi, 733 p. : ill. ; 26 cm. + hbk.ISBN: 0444880984 (v. 1).Subject(s): Game theory | Economics, MathematicalDDC classification: 519.3
Contents:
The game of chess -- Games in extensive and strategic forms -- Games with perfect information -- Repeated games with complete information -- Repeated games of incomplete information: zero sum -- Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum -- Noncooperative models of bargaining -- Strategic analysis of auctions -- Location -- Strategic models of entry deterrence -- Patent licensing -- The core and balancedness -- Axiomatizations of the core -- The core in perfectly competitive economics -- The core in imperfectly competitive economies -- Two-sided matching -- Von Neumann- Morgenstern stable sets -- The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus -- Game and decision theoretic models in ethics.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Copy number Status Barcode
General lending MTU Bishopstown Library Lending 519.3 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Available 00075153
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

The game of chess -- Games in extensive and strategic forms -- Games with perfect information -- Repeated games with complete information -- Repeated games of incomplete information: zero sum -- Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum -- Noncooperative models of bargaining -- Strategic analysis of auctions -- Location -- Strategic models of entry deterrence -- Patent licensing -- The core and balancedness -- Axiomatizations of the core -- The core in perfectly competitive economics -- The core in imperfectly competitive economies -- Two-sided matching -- Von Neumann- Morgenstern stable sets -- The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus -- Game and decision theoretic models in ethics.