Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism: that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified: they can neither be established as certainly true nor even as 'probable' (in the sense of the probability calculus). Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the problems which we try to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory - that is, of a tentative solution to our problem - is always a step forward that takes us nearer the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes. As we learn from our mistakes our knowledge grows, even though we may never know - that is, know for certain. Since our knowledge can grow, there can be no reason here for despair of reason. And since we can never know for certain, the can be no authority here for any claim to authority, for conceit over our knowledge, or for smugness.
The essays and lectures of which this book is composed apply this thesis to many topics, ranging from problems of the philosophy and history of the physical and social sciences to historical and political problems.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Preface (p. xi)
• Acknowledgements (p. xiv)
• Preface to the Second Edition (p. xv)
• Preface to the Third Edition (p. xvii)
• Introduction: On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance (p. 3)
• Conjectures
• 1 Science: Conjectures and Refutations (p. 43)
• Appendix Some Problems in the Philosophy of Science (p. 78)
• 2 The Nature of Philosophical Problems and their Roots in Science (p. 87)
• 3 Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge (p. 130)
• 1 The Science of Galileo and Its Most Recent Betrayal (p. 130)
• 2 The Issue at Stake (p. 134)
• 3 The First View: Ultimate Explanation by Essences (p. 139)
• 4 The Second View: Theories as Instruments (p. 144)
• 5 Criticism of the Instrumentalist View (p. 149)
• 6 The Third View: Conjectures, Truth, and Reality (p. 153)
• 4 Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition (p. 161)
• 5 Back to the Presocratics (p. 183)
• Appendix Historical Conjectures and Heraclitus on Change (p. 206)
• 6 A Note on Berkeley as Precursor of Mach and Einstein (p. 224)
• 7 Kant's Critique and Cosmology (p. 237)
• 1 Kant and the Enlightenment (p. 238)
• 2 Kant's Newtonian Cosmology (p. 240)
• 3 The Critique and the Cosmological Problem (p. 241)
• 4 Space and Time (p. 242)
• 5 Kant's Copernican Revolution (p. 244)
• 6 The Doctrine of Autonomy (p. 246)
• 8 On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics (p. 249)
• 1 Kant and the Logic of Experience (p. 249)
• 2 The Problem of the Irrefutability of Philosophical Theories (p. 261)
• 9 Why are the Calculi of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality? (p. 272)
• 10 Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (p. 291)
• 1 The Growth of Knowledge: Theories and Problems (p. 291)
• 2 The Theory of Objective Truth: Correspondence to the Facts (p. 302)
• 3 Truth and Content: Verisimilitude versus Probability (p. 309)
• 4 Background Knowledge and Scientific Growth (p. 322)
• 5 Three Requirements for the Growth of Knowledge (p. 326)
• Appendix A Presumably False yet Formally Highly Probable Non-Empirical Statement (p. 336)
• Refutations
• 11 The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics (p. 341)
• 1 Introduction (p. 342)
• 2 My Own View of the Problem (p. 344)
• 3 Carnap's First Theory of Meaninglessness (p. 349)
• 4 Carnap and the Language of Science (p. 356)
• 5 Testability and Meaning (p. 368)
• 6 Probability and Induction (p. 377)
• 12 Language and the Body-Mind Problem (p. 395)
• 1 Introduction (p. 395)
• 2 Four Major Functions of Language (p. 397)
• 3 A Group of Theses (p. 398)
• 4 The Machine Argument (p. 399)
• 5 The Causal Theory of Naming (p. 401)
• 6 Interaction (p. 402)
• 7 Conclusion (p. 402)
• 13 A Note on the Body-Mind Problem (p. 403)
• 14 Self-Reference and Meaning in Ordinary Language (p. 409)
• 15 What is Dialectic? (p. 419)
• 1 Dialectic Explained (p. 419)
• 2 Hegelian Dialectic (p. 435)
• 3 Dialectic After Hegel (p. 445)
• 16 Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences (p. 452)
• 17 Public Opinion and Liberal Principles (p. 467)
• 1 The Myth of Public Opinion (p. 467)
• 2 The Dangers of Public Opinion (p. 470)
• 3 Liberal Principles: A Group of Theses (p. 471)
• 4 The Liberal Theory of Free Discussion (p. 473)
• 5 The Forms of Public Opinion (p. 475)
• 6 Some Practical Problems: Censorship and Monopolies of Publicity (p. 475)
• 7 A Short List of Political Illustrations (p. 476)
• 8 Summary (p. 476)
• 18 Utopia and Violence (p. 477)
• 19 The History of Our Time: An Optimist's View (p. 489)
• 20 Humanism and Reason (p. 506)
• Addenda: Some Technical Notes (p. 517)
• 1 Empirical Content (p. 517)
• 2 Probability and the Severity of Tests (p. 522)
• 3 Verisimilitude (p. 527)
• 4 Numerical Examples (p. 535)
• 5 Artificial vs. Formalized Languages (p. 537)
• 6 A Historical Note on Verisimilitude (1964) (p. 538)
• 7 Some Further Hints on Verisimilitude (1968) (p. 541)
• 8 Further Remarks on the Presocratics, especially on Parmenides (1968) (p. 545)
• 9 The Presocratics: Unity or Novelty? (1968) (p. 556)
• 10 An Argument, due to Mark Twain, against Naive Empiricism (1989) (p. 557)
• Index of Mottoes (p. 558)
• Index of Names (p. 559)
• Index of Subjects (p. 567)

Author notes provided by Syndetics