Corporate governance : financial responsibility, controls and ethics / Erik Banks.
By: Banks, Erik
.
Material type:
BookSeries: Finance and capital markets series: Publisher: New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2004Description: xvi, 496 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.ISBN: 1403916683 (cloth : alk. paper); 9781403916686.Subject(s): Corporate governance| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General lending | MTU Kerry North Campus Library First Floor Main | 658.4 BAN (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 38888000544258 |
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Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:
Corporate Governance is a text which considers the problems surrounding governance and proposes solutions to help restore investor confidence in the corporate world. The book is intended for board members, corporate executives, regulators, auditors, creditors and analysts seeking a concise analysis of the governance issues facing financial and non-financial corporations round the world. The book is fully international in context and includes real-life examples and cases to emphasize the practical nature of governance problems and solutions.
Formerly CIP. Uk
Includes bibliographical references (p. 483-489) and index.
'Corporate Governance' is a new text which considers the problems surrounding governance and proposes solutions to help restore investor confidence in the corporate world.
Table of contents provided by Syndetics
- List of figures (p. xi)
- List of tables (p. xiii)
- Acknowledgments (p. xv)
- The author (p. xvi)
- Part I The Function of Corporate Governance (p. 1)
- 1 Governance defined (p. 3)
- The re-emergence of governance (p. 3)
- Basic corporate structure (p. 11)
- Limited liability, equity investors, and debt holders (p. 11)
- Value maximization and the search for enterprise value (p. 14)
- Diffusion, control, and the agency problem (p. 17)
- Forms of ownership and control (p. 20)
- Accountability and the need for corporate governance (p. 22)
- Internal governance (p. 24)
- External governance (p. 24)
- The benefits of governance (p. 30)
- 2 Internal governance mechanisms: corporate accountability (p. 32)
- The board of directors (p. 34)
- Executive management (p. 42)
- Internal control groups (p. 44)
- Code of conduct (p. 47)
- Implementation of internal governance measures (p. 48)
- Best practice codes (p. 50)
- 3 External governance mechanisms: systemic accountability (p. 54)
- Regulatory oversight (p. 54)
- Legal/bankruptcy regimes (p. 56)
- Capital markets access (p. 59)
- Corporate control activity (p. 61)
- Mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs (p. 65)
- LBOs and MBOs (p. 67)
- Antitakeover defenses (p. 68)
- Block holder monitoring (p. 70)
- Activist institutional investor monitoring (p. 74)
- External audits (p. 77)
- Credit rating agency review (p. 79)
- 4 Protecting internal and external stakeholders (p. 83)
- Direct and indirect stakeholders (p. 85)
- Shareholders (p. 86)
- Labor/employees (p. 88)
- Creditors (p. 90)
- Customers and suppliers (p. 94)
- Professional service providers (p. 96)
- Communities (p. 97)
- Indirect stakeholders (p. 98)
- Protecting stakeholders (p. 99)
- Part II Corporate Governance Problems (p. 101)
- 5 Common failures in the governance process (p. 103)
- Flaws in governance (p. 103)
- Detecting governance flaws (p. 105)
- Failure of board directors and executive management (p. 106)
- Ineffective boards (p. 107)
- Breach of duties of care and loyalty (p. 115)
- Entrenched management (p. 115)
- Failure of corporate policies (p. 116)
- Failure of internal controls (p. 131)
- Lack of technically qualified, independent controls (p. 132)
- Liberal accounting policies (p. 133)
- Excessive risk-taking (p. 134)
- Inadequate internal audits (p. 135)
- Failure of external controls (p. 136)
- Inadequate regulatory mechanisms (p. 136)
- Insufficient legal/bankruptcy regimes (p. 140)
- Lack of block holder/activist investor monitoring (p. 140)
- Weak/underdeveloped capital markets (p. 141)
- Misguided/insufficient corporate control activity (p. 143)
- Unacceptable external audit practices (p. 144)
- 6 The impact of governance problems on corporate operations (p. 147)
- First stage impact: reputational damage (p. 150)
- Second stage impact: early financial problems (p. 151)
- Third stage impact: growing financial distress (p. 154)
- Fourth stage impact: bankruptcy (p. 157)
- The impact of bankruptcy on stakeholders (p. 159)
- 7 Studies in flawed governance I: companies (p. 166)
- Company studies (p. 170)
- Case study 1 Enron, USA (p. 170)
- Case study 2 Arthur Andersen, USA (p. 175)
- Case study 3 WorldCom, USA (p. 179)
- Case study 4 Tyco International, USA/Bermuda (p. 185)
- Case study 5 Adelphia Communications, USA (p. 189)
- Case study 6 Allfirst/Allied Irish Bank, USA/Ireland (p. 192)
- Case study 7 Waste Management, USA (p. 196)
- Case study 8 SAirGroup (Swissair), Switzerland (p. 200)
- Case study 9 Vivendi, France (p. 204)
- Case study 10 Daewoo Group, Korea (p. 208)
- Case study 11 Asea Brown Boveri, Sweden/Switzerland (p. 211)
- Case study 12 Kirch Media, Germany (p. 214)
- Case study 13 Ahold, the Netherlands (p. 217)
- Case study 14 Lernout and Hauspie, Belgium (p. 220)
- Case study 15 Global Crossing, USA/Bermuda (p. 223)
- Case study 16 HealthSouth, USA (p. 226)
- 8 Studies in flawed governance II: sectors and industries (p. 231)
- Case study 1 Global external auditors (p. 232)
- Case study 2 US energy trading companies (p. 239)
- Case study 3 Japanese sokaiya scandals (p. 244)
- Case study 4 US investment banking and research (p. 247)
- Case study 5 Indonesian business and banking groups (p. 250)
- Part III Corporate Governance Reforms (p. 257)
- 9 Strengthening the governance process I: micro reforms (p. 259)
- Strengthening the board of directors and executive management (p. 261)
- Establishing active, independent, and responsive boards (p. 262)
- Reducing board size (p. 264)
- Creating technically expert, independent board committees (p. 264)
- Separating the roles of chairperson and CEO (p. 271)
- Aligning board director interests (p. 274)
- Limiting D&O insurance coverage (p. 274)
- Piercing the corporate veil for directors and executives (p. 275)
- Reducing information asymmetries (p. 276)
- Refocusing corporate policies (p. 276)
- Developing rational compensation standards (p. 277)
- Creating effective disclosure (p. 279)
- Supporting shareholder rights (p. 281)
- Returning excess capital (p. 283)
- Defining and publicizing strategy (p. 283)
- Developing and demonstrating a long-term perspective (p. 284)
- Engaging institutional investors (p. 285)
- Enhancing internal controls (p. 286)
- Developing proper accounting policies (p. 286)
- Enhancing internal audit (p. 287)
- Reinforcing a culture of risk management (p. 287)
- Implementing crisis management programs (p. 288)
- Conducting effective post-mortems (p. 289)
- 10 Strengthening the governance process II: macro reforms (p. 291)
- Promoting changes in regulatory oversight (p. 292)
- Regulating potential conflicts of interest (p. 293)
- Promoting uniform and meaningful accounting rules (p. 294)
- Developing proper regulatory disclosure (p. 295)
- Encouraging long-term investment (p. 297)
- Protecting assets, investments, and pensions (p. 297)
- Enhancing general governance mechanisms (p. 298)
- Strengthening legal frameworks and bankruptcy processes (p. 299)
- Deepening capital markets and promoting corporate control activity (p. 301)
- Enhancing external audit practices (p. 303)
- Encouraging investor activism (p. 304)
- The legislative angle: the example of Sarbanes--Oxley (p. 307)
- Creating a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (p. 308)
- Ensuring auditor independence and establishing an audit committee (p. 309)
- Assigning corporate responsibility (p. 311)
- Enhancing financial disclosures (p. 312)
- Resolving analyst conflicts of interest (p. 313)
- Assigning accountability for corporate and criminal fraud (p. 314)
- Expanding white collar crime penalties (p. 314)
- The international view of S--O (p. 315)
- 11 Improving corporate ethics (p. 318)
- Corporate ethics versus corporate responsibility (p. 319)
- Creating and reinforcing a proper ethical culture (p. 320)
- Ethical norms (p. 323)
- Ethical behavior and internal governance mechanisms (p. 325)
- 12 Summary: towards substantive governance (p. 327)
- Simple rules of substantive governance (p. 328)
- Can governance changes work? (p. 332)
- Appendix Implementing global best practice (p. 335)
- Supranational (p. 338)
- OECD (p. 338)
- BIS (p. 340)
- European Union (p. 342)
- Australia (p. 344)
- Belgium (p. 345)
- Brazil (p. 348)
- Canada (p. 349)
- France (p. 352)
- Germany (p. 354)
- Italy (p. 356)
- Japan (p. 359)
- Korea (p. 361)
- Malaysia (p. 364)
- The Netherlands (p. 366)
- Singapore (p. 368)
- South Africa (p. 371)
- Spain (p. 374)
- Sweden (p. 376)
- Switzerland (p. 377)
- United Kingdom (p. 380)
- United States (p. 384)
- Notes (p. 390)
- The language of governance (p. 463)
- Selected bibliography (p. 483)
- Index (p. 490)