Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• List of Figures (p. x)
• List of Tables (p. xiii)
• List of Games (p. xv)
• Preface (p. xviii)
• Contents and Purpose (p. xviii)
• Changes in the Second Edition, 1994 (p. xviii)
• Changes in the Third Edition, 2001 (p. xix)
• Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006 (p. xx)
• Using the Book (p. xxii)
• The Level of Mathematics (p. xxii)
• Other Books (p. xxiii)
• Contact Information (p. xxviii)
• Acknowledgements (p. xxviii)
• Introduction (p. 1)
• History (p. 1)
• Game Theory's Method (p. 2)
• Exemplifying Theory (p. 2)
• This Book's Style (p. 4)
• Notes (p. 6)
• Part 1 Game Theory (p. 9)
• 1 The Rules of the Game (p. 11)
• 1.1 Definitions (p. 11)
• 1.2 Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma (p. 19)
• 1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea (p. 22)
• 1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordination (p. 26)
• 1.5 Focal Points (p. 32)
• Notes (p. 33)
• Problems (p. 36)
• Classroom Game: Fisheries (polished) (p. 39)
• 2 Information (p. 40)
• 2.1 The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game (p. 40)
• 2.2 Information Sets (p. 45)
• 2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information (p. 49)
• 2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games (p. 52)
• 2.5 An Example: The Png Settlement Game (p. 61)
• Notes (p. 64)
• Problems (p. 66)
• Classroom Game: Bayes' Rule at the Bar (in between) (p. 68)
• 3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies (p. 69)
• 3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game (p. 69)
• 3.2 The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing (p. 74)
• 3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game (p. 81)
• 3.4 Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game (p. 85)
• 3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game (p. 87)
• 3.6 Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic Substitutes (p. 90)
• 3.7 Existence of Equilibrium (p. 95)
• Notes (p. 98)
• Problems (p. 103)
• Classroom Game: The War of Attrition (polished) (p. 107)
• 4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information (p. 108)
• 4.1 Subgame Perfectness (p. 108)
• 4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I (p. 111)
• 4.3 Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits (p. 113)
• 4.4 Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection (p. 120)
• Notes (p. 122)
• Problems (p. 123)
• Classroom Game: U.S. Air for Sale (polished) (p. 126)
• 5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information (p. 128)
• 5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox (p. 128)
• 5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem (p. 130)
• 5.3 Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemma (p. 136)
• 5.4 Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game (p. 137)
• 5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costs (p. 141)
• 5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game (p. 143)
• Notes (p. 147)
• Problems (p. 151)
• Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (in between) (p. 155)
• 6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information (p. 156)
• 6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III (p. 156)
• 6.2 Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Games (p. 160)
• 6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V (p. 164)
• 6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model (p. 166)
• 6.5 The Axelrod Tournament (p. 169)
• 6.6 Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model (p. 170)
• Notes (p. 172)
• Problems (p. 175)
• Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Incomplete Information (improveable) (p. 177)
• Part 2 Asymmetric Information (p. 179)
• 7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions (p. 181)
• 7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models (p. 181)
• 7.2 A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game (p. 184)
• 7.3 The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints (p. 194)
• 7.4 Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game (p. 195)
• Notes (p. 201)
• Problems (p. 204)
• Classroom Game: Moral Hazard Contracts Game (improveable) (p. 210)
• 8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard (p. 211)
• 8.1 Efficiency Wages (p. 211)
• 8.2 Tournaments (p. 214)
• 8.3 Institutions and Agency Problems (p. 216)
• 8.4 Renegotiation: The Repossession Game (p. 219)
• 8.5 State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II (p. 222)
• 8.6 Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model (p. 227)
• 8.7 The Multitask Agency Problem (p. 230)
• Notes (p. 236)
• Problems (p. 239)
• Classroom Game: Lobbying Teams (polished) (p. 242)
• 9 Adverse Selection (p. 243)
• 9.1 Introduction: Production Game VI (p. 243)
• 9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II (p. 249)
• 9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons Il and IV (p. 252)
• 9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III (p. 255)
• 9.5 Market Microstructure (p. 259)
• 9.6 A Variety of Applications (p. 263)
• 9.7 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII (p. 266)
• Notes (p. 269)
• Problems (p. 272)
• Classroom Game: Adverse Selection in Stock Sales (improveable) (p. 275)
• 10 Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge (p. 276)
• 10.1 Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle (p. 276)
• 10.2 Myerson Mechanism Design (p. 287)
• 10.3 An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game (p. 289)
• 10.4 The Groves Mechanism (p. 293)
• 10.5 Price Discrimination (p. 296)
• 10.6 Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement (p. 304)
• Notes (p. 314)
• Problems (p. 316)
• Classroom Game: Regulatory Ratcheting (improveable) (p. 319)
• 11 Signaling (p. 320)
• 11.1 The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling (p. 320)
• 11.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education (p. 324)
• 11.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education (p. 329)
• 11.4 The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening (p. 330)
• 11.5 Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues (p. 338)
• 11.6 Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing (p. 341)
• 11.7 Countersignalling (p. 345)
• Notes (p. 348)
• Problems (p. 349)
• Classroom Game: Signalling Marriageability (improveable) (p. 353)
• Part 3 Applications (p. 355)
• 12 Bargaining (p. 357)
• 12.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie (p. 357)
• 12.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution (p. 359)
• 12.3 Alternating Offers over Finite Time (p. 361)
• 12.4 Alternating Offers over Infinite Time (p. 362)
• 12.5 Incomplete Information (p. 365)
• 12.6 Setting Up a Way to Bargain: the Myerson-Satterthwaite Model (p. 369)
• Notes (p. 380)
• Problems (p. 381)
• Classroom Game: Labor Bargaining (polished) (p. 384)
• 13 Auctions (p. 385)
• 13.1 Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete (p. 385)
• 13.2 Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions (p. 390)
• 13.3 Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty (p. 403)
• 13.4 Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach (p. 409)
• 13.5 Common-value Auctions and the Winner's Curse (p. 414)
• 13.6 Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game (p. 423)
• Notes (p. 428)
• Problems (p. 430)
• Classroom Game: Auctions (polished) (p. 432)
• 14 Pricing (p. 433)
• 14.1 Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited (p. 433)
• 14.2 Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox (p. 436)
• 14.3 Location Models (p. 441)
• 14.4 Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games (p. 449)
• 14.5 Vertical Differentiation (p. 454)
• 14.6 Durable Monopoly (p. 461)
• Notes (p. 467)
• Problems (p. 469)
• Classroom Game: The Kleit Oligopoly Game (polished) (p. 472)
• Mathematical Appendix (p. 473)
• A.1 Notation (p. 473)
• A.2 The Greek Alphabet (p. 475)
• A.3 Glossary (p. 475)
• A.4 Formulas and Functions (p. 479)
• A.5 Probability Distributions (p. 480)
• A.6 Supermodularity (p. 482)
• A.7 Fixed Point Theorems (p. 484)
• A.8 Genericity (p. 485)
• A.9 Discounting (p. 486)
• A.10 Risk (p. 487)
• References and Name Index (p. 493)
• Subject Index (p. 521)

Author notes provided by Syndetics