Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

Binmore' s groundbreaking text on game theory explores the manner in which rational people should interact when they have conflicting interests. While Binmore uses a light touch to outline key developments in theory, the text remains a serious exposition of a serious topic. In addition, his unique story-telling approach allows students to immediately apply game-theoretic skills to simple problems. Each chapter ends with a host of challenging exercises to help students practice the skills they have learned. The highly anticipated revision, expected in 2003, will include more coverage of cooperative game theory and a more accessible presentation--with chapters broken up into smaller chunks and an abundance of economic examples integrated throughout the text.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Teaching Guide
• Introduction
• What Is Game Theory About?
• Where Is Game Theory Coming From?
• Where Is Game Theory Going To?
• What Can Game Theory Do for Us?
• Conclusion
• 1 Winning Out
• 1.1 Introduction
• 1.2 The Rules of the Game
• 1.3 Strategies
• 1.4 Zermelo's Algorithm
• 1.5 Nim
• 1.6 Hex
• 1.7 Chess
• 1.8 Rational Play? Conflict and Cooperation Exercises
• 2. Taking Chances
• 2.1 Introduction
• 2.2 Lotteries
• 2.3 Game Values
• 2.4 Duel
• 2.5 Parcheesi
• 2.6 Exercises
• 3 Accounting for Tastes
• 3.1 Rational Preferences
• 3.2 Utility Functions
• 3.3 Russian Roulette
• 3.4 Making Risky Choices
• 3.5 Utility Scales
• 3.6 The Noble Savage
• 3.7 Exercises
• 4 Getting Paid Off
• 4.1 Payoffs
• 4.2 Bimatrix Games
• 4.3 Matrices
• 4.4 Vectors
• 4.5 Hyperplanes
• 4.6 Domination
• 4.7 Russian Roulette Again
• 4.8 Exercises
• 5 Making Deals
• 5.1 Introduction
• 5.2 Convexity
• 5.3 Cooperative Payoff Regions
• 5.4 The Bargaining Set
• 5.5 Nash Bargaining Solutions
• 5.6 Dividing the Dollar
• 5.7 Cooperative and Noncooperative Games
• 5.8 Bargaining Models
• 5.9 Exercises
• 6 Mixing Things Up
• 6.1 Introduction
• 6.2 Minimax and Maximin
• 6.3 Safety First
• 6.4 Mixed Strategies
• 6.5 Zero-Sum Games
• 6.6 Separating Hyperplanes
• 6.7 Battleships
• 6.8 The Inspection Game Nash Threat Game Exercises
• 7 Keeping Your Balance
• 7.1 Reaction Curves
• 7.2 Oligopoly and Perfect Competition
• 7.3 Equilibrium Selection
• 7.4 Nash Demand Game
• 7.5 Pre-play Negotiation
• 7.6 Pre-play Randomization
• 7.7 When Do Nash Equilibria Exist?
• 7.8 Hexing Brouwer
• 7.9 Exercises
• 8 Repeating Yourself
• 8.1 Reciprocity
• 8.2 Repeating a Zero-Sum Game
• 8.3 Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma
• 8.4 Infinite Repetitions
• 8.5 Social Contract
• 8.6 Exercises
• 9 Adjusting to Circumstances
• 9.1 Spontaneous Order
• 9.2 Bounded Rationality
• 9.3 Economic Libration
• 9.4 Social Libration
• 9.5 Biological Libration
• 9.6 Evolution Stability
• 9.7 The Evolution of Cooperation
• 9.8 Exercises
• 10 Knowing Your Place
• 10.1 Bob's Your Uncle
• 10.2 Knowledge
• 10.3 Possibility
• 10.4 Information Sets
• 10.5 Bayesian Updating
• 10.6 Common Knowledge
• 10.7 Agreeing to Disagree? Common Knowledge in Game Theory Exercises
• 11 Knowing Who to Believe
• 11.1 Complete and Incomplete Information
• 11.2 Typecasting
• 11.3 Bayesian Equilibrium
• 11.4 Continuous Random Variables
• 11.5 Duopoly with Incomplete Information
• 11.6 Purification
• 11.7 Auctions and Mechanism Design
• 11.8 Assessment Equilibrium
• 11.9 More Agreeing to Disagree
• 11.10 Exercises
• 12 Bluffing It Out
• 12.1 Poker
• 12.2 Conditional Probability Densities
• 12.3 Borel's Poker Model
• 12.4 Von Neuman's Poker Model
• 12.5 Why Bluff?
• 12.6 Nash and Shapley's Poker Model
• 12.7 Conclusion
• Answers
• Index