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A properly implemented and managed RCM program can save millions in unscheduled maintenance and breakdowns. However, many have found the process daunting. Written by an expert with over 30 years of experience, this book introduces innovative approaches to simplify the RCM process such as: single vs. multiple failure analysis, hidden failures analysis, potentially critical components analysis, run-to-failure and the difference between redundant, standby, and backup functions. Included are real life examples of flawed preventive maintenance programs and how they led to disasters that could have easily been avoided. Also illustrated in detail, with real-life examples, is the step-by-step process for developing, implementing, and maintaining a premier classical RCM program. Senior management, middle management, supervisors, and craftsmen/technicians responsible for plant safety and reliability will find this book to be invaluable as a means for establishing a first class preventive maintenance program.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Preface (p. xiii)
• Acknowledgments (p. xix)
• Chapter 1 Introduction to RCM (p. 1)
• 1.1 Uncovering the Fuzziness and Mystique of RCM (p. 4)
• 1.2 The Background of RCM (p. 9)
• 1.3 A No-Nonsense Approach to RCM (p. 11)
• 1.4 RCM as a Major Factor in the Bottom Line (p. 12)
• Chapter 2 Why RCM Has Historically Been So Difficult to Implement (p. 15)
• 2.1 Consultants (p. 15)
• 2.2 A White Elephant (p. 16)
• 2.3 Reasons for Failure (p. 18)
• 2.3.1 Loss of In-House Control (p. 18)
• 2.3.2 An Incorrect Mix of Personnel Performing the Analysis (p. 19)
• 2.3.3 Unnecessary and Costly Administrative Burdens (p. 20)
• 2.3.4 Fundamental RCM Concepts Not Understood (p. 21)
• 2.3.5 Confusion Determining System Functions (p. 21)
• 2.3.6 Confusion Concerning System Boundaries and Interfaces (p. 21)
• 2.3.7 Divergent Expectations (p. 23)
• 2.3.8 Confusion Regarding Convention (p. 24)
• 2.3.9 Misunderstanding "Hidden" Failures and Redundancy (p. 24)
• 2.3.10 Misunderstanding Run-to-Failure (p. 25)
• 2.3.11 Inappropriate Component Classifications (p. 25)
• 2.3.12 Instruments Were Not Included as Part of the RCM Analysis (p. 26)
• Chapter 3 Fundamental RCM Concepts Explained, Some for the Very First Time: The Next Plateau (p. 27)
• 3.1 The Three Phases of an RCM-Based Preventive Maintenance Program (p. 30)
• 3.2 The Three Cornerstones of RCM (p. 32)
• 3.3 Hidden Failures, Redundancy, and Critical Components (p. 34)
• 3.4 Testing Hidden Systems (p. 45)
• 3.5 The Missing Link: Potentially Critical Components (p. 46)
• 3.6 Commitment Components (p. 50)
• 3.7 Economic Components (p. 51)
• 3.8 The "Canon Law" of Run-to-Failure Components (p. 52)
• 3.9 The Integration of Preventive and Corrective Maintenance and the Distinction Between Potentially Critical and Run-to-Failure Components (p. 57)
• 3.9.1 An RTF CM versus a Critical CM: Which Takes Priority for Getting Worked First? (p. 59)
• 3.10 The Anatomy of a Disaster (p. 61)
• 3.11 A Deeper Look at Critical Components, Potentially Critical Components, and Hidden Failures-How They All Fit Together (p. 65)
• 3.12 Finding the Anomalies (p. 68)
• 3.13 Failures Found During Operator Rounds (p. 70)
• 3.14 Redundant, Standby, and Backup Functions (p. 70)
• 3.15 Typical Examples of Component Classifications (p. 73)
• 3.16 Component Classification Hierarchy (p. 73)
• 3.17 The Defensive Strategies of a PM Program (p. 75)
• 3.18 Eliminating the Requirement for Identifying Boundaries and Interfaces (p. 75)
• 3.19 Functions and Functional Failures Are Identified at the Component Level, Not the System and Subsystem Level (p. 77)
• 3.20 The Quest for the Consequence of Failure (p. 79)
• 3.21 The COFA versus the FMEA (p. 81)
• 3.22 How Do You Know When Your Plant Is Reliable? (p. 83)
• 3.23 Chapter Summary (p. 85)
• Chapter 4 RCM Implementation: Preparation and Tools (p. 89)
• 4.1 Preparation (p. 90)
• 4.2 The Sequential Elements Needed for the Analysis (p. 91)
• 4.2.1 A Simple but Comprehensive Alphanumeric Equipment I.D. Database (p. 91)
• 4.2.2 Informational Resources (p. 93)
• 4.2.3 Establishing Convention (p. 94)
• 4.2.4 Specialized Workstations and Software (p. 94)
• 4.2.5 The COFA Excel Spreadsheet versus the FMEA (p. 95)
• 4.2.6 The PM Task Worksheet (p. 100)
• 4.2.7 The Economic Evaluation Worksheet (p. 102)
• 4.3 Chapter Summary (p. 105)
• Chapter 5 RCM Made Simple: Implementation Process (p. 107)
• 5.1 Define Your Asset Reliability Strategy (p. 109)
• 5.2 Understanding the RCM COFA Logic Tree, the Potentially Critical Guideline, and the Economically Significant Guideline (p. 112)
• 5.3 Completing the COFA Worksheet in Conjunction with the COFA Logic Tree, the Potentially Critical Guideline, and the Economically Significant Guideline (p. 120)
• 5.3.1 Describe the Component Functions (p. 121)
• 5.3.2 Describe the Functional Failures (p. 123)
• 5.3.3 Describe the Dominant Component Failure Modes for Each Functional Failure (p. 124)
• 5.3.4 Is the Occurrence of the Failure Mode Evident? (p. 124)
• 5.3.5 Describe the System Effect for Each Failure Mode (p. 126)
• 5.3.6 Describe the Consequence of Failure Based on the Asset Reliability Criteria You Selected (p. 129)
• 5.3.7 Define the Component Classification (p. 129)
• 5.4 RCM Serves as a Translation of the Design Objectives (p. 131)
• 5.5 Companion Equipment (p. 133)
• 5.6 The SAE Standard: Document JA1011 (p. 134)
• 5.7 A Real-Life Analysis: Averting a Potentially Devastating Plant Consequence (p. 135)
• 5.8 Why Streamlined RCM Methods Are Not Recommended (p. 141)
• 5.8.1 Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) (p. 142)
• 5.8.2 Reliability-Based Maintenance (RBM) (p. 142)
• 5.8.3 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) Based Maintenance (p. 142)
• 5.8.4 80/20 Rule (p. 142)
• 5.9 Chapter Summary (p. 143)
• 5.10 RCM Made "Difficult" (p. 147)
• 5.10.1 Determine System Boundaries (p. 148)
• 5.10.2 Determine Subsystem Boundaries (p. 148)
• 5.10.3 Determine Interfaces (p. 149)
• 5.10.4 Determine Functions (p. 149)
• 5.10.5 Determine the Functional Failures (p. 150)
• 5.10.6 Determine Which Equipment Is Responsible for the Functional Failures (p. 150)
• Chapter 6 The PM Task Selection Process (p. 153)
• 6.1 Understanding Preventive Maintenance Task Terminology (p. 154)
• 6.2 Condition-Directed, Time-Directed, and Failure-Finding Tasks (p. 154)
• 6.3 The PM Task Worksheet (p. 157)
• 6.4 The PM Task Selection Logic Tree (p. 158)
• 6.5 Why a Condition-Directed Task Is Preferred (p. 161)
• 6.6 Determining the PM Task Frequency and Interval (p. 162)
• 6.6.1 The Optimum Time to Establish a Reliability Program (p. 165)
• 6.7 Is a Design Change Recommended? (p. 166)
• 6.8 Completing a Typical PM Task Worksheet (p. 167)
• 6.9 Institute Technical Restraints (p. 168)
• 6.10 A Sampling Strategy (p. 169)
• 6.11 Common Mode Failures (p. 171)
• 6.12 Different Predictive Maintenance (PdM) Techniques (p. 172)
• 6.12.1 Vibration Monitoring and Analysis (p. 172)
• 6.12.2 Acoustic Monitoring (p. 173)
• 6.12.3 Thermography or Infrared Monitoring (p. 173)
• 6.12.4 Oil Sampling and Analysis (p. 173)
• 6.12.5 X-ray or Radiography Inspection (p. 173)
• 6.12.6 Magnetic Particle Inspection (p. 174)
• 6.12.7 Eddy Current Testing (p. 174)
• 6.12.8 Ultrasonic Testing (p. 174)
• 6.12.9 Liquid Penetrant (p. 174)
• 6.12.10 Motor Current Signature Analysis (MCSA) (p. 174)
• 6.12.11 Boroscope Inspections (p. 174)
• 6.12.12 Diagnostics for Motor-Operated Valves (p. 175)
• 6.12.13 Diagnostics for Air-Operated Valves (p. 175)
• 6.13 Chapter Summary (p. 175)
• Chapter 7 RCM for Instruments (p. 181)
• 7.1 Instrument Categories (p. 182)
• 7.2 Instrument Design Tolerance Criteria (p. 183)
• 7.3 The Instrument Logic Tree (p. 185)
• 7.3.1 Block 1: Is the Instrument a Functional Instrument? (p. 185)
• 7.3.2 Block 2: Instrument Is Analyzed in the COFA Worksheet and the PM Task Selection Worksheet (p. 185)
• 7.3.3 Block 3: Can the Instrument Reading Result in an Operator Having to Initiate Some Kind of Action? (p. 185)
• 7.3.4 Block 4: A PM Is Required. Calibration Criteria and Periodicity Guidance Are as Follows (p. 186)
• 7.3.5 Block 5: Were the Last Three Successive Calibrations Within Vendor Tolerance Criteria? (p. 186)
• 7.3.6 Block 6: Periodicity Extension Is Allowed (p. 187)
• 7.3.7 Block 7: Reduce Periodicity or Implement a Design Change (p. 187)
• 7.3.8 Block 8: Is the Instrument Redundant? (p. 187)
• 7.3.9 Block 9: Is an Indication Comparison Applicable? (p. 187)
• 7.3.10 Block 10: Is the Consequence of Excessive Drift (to the Point of Instrument Failure) Acceptable? (p. 188)
• 7.3.11 Block 11: A Calibration PM Is Optional (p. 189)
• 7.3.12 Block 12: A PM Is Required. Calibration Criteria and Periodicity Guidance Are as Follows (p. 189)
• 7.3.13 Block 13: Were the Last Two Successive Calibrations Within a +/-2.5 Percent Accuracy Tolerance? (p. 189)
• 7.3.14 Block 14: Periodicity Extension Is Allowed (p. 189)
• 7.3.15 Block 15: Were the Last Two Successive Calibrations Within a +/-5.0 Percent Accuracy Tolerance? (p. 189)
• 7.3.16 Block 16: Periodicity Extension Is Not Allowed (p. 190)
• 7.3.17 Block 17: Reduce Periodicity or Implement a Design Change (p. 190)
• 7.4 Chapter Summary (p. 190)
• Chapter 8 The RCM Living Program (p. 193)
• 8.1 A Model for an RCM Living Program (p. 194)
• 8.1.1 The Craft Feedback Evaluation Element (p. 196)
• 8.1.2 The Corrective Maintenance (CM) Evaluation Element (p. 203)
• 8.1.3 The "Other Inputs" Element (p. 205)
• 8.1.3.1 Root-Cause Evaluations (p. 206)
• 8.1.3.2 Vendor Bulletins (p. 206)
• 8.1.3.3 Regulatory Bulletins (p. 207)
• 8.1.3.4 Industry Failure Data (p. 207)
• 8.1.3.5 Engineering Evaluations (p. 208)
• 8.1.3.6 Plant Design Changes (p. 208)
• 8.1.3.7 New Commitments (p. 208)
• 8.1.4 Monitoring and Trending (p. 209)
• 8.1.5 The RCM Analysis Element (p. 209)
• 8.1.6 Equipment Database (p. 210)
• 8.1.7 The PM Audit (p. 210)
• 8.2 Chapter Summary (p. 212)
• Chapter 9 An RCM Monitoring and Trending Strategy (p. 217)
• 9.1 What Is Reliability and How Do You Measure It? (p. 218)
• 9.2 Monitoring Reliability Is Like Monitoring the Human Body (p. 220)
• 9.3 Caution: Avoid Analysis Paralysis Performance Monitoring (p. 220)
• 9.4 The Aggregate Metrics (p. 222)
• 9.4.1 Unplanned Plant or Facility Trips (p. 223)
• 9.4.2 Capacity Factor (p. 224)
• 9.4.3 Unplanned Operator Actions (p. 224)
• 9.4.4 Unplanned Power Reductions (p. 225)
• 9.4.5 Production Delays (p. 225)
• 9.4.6 Enforcement Actions (p. 226)
• 9.4.7 Litigation Occurrences (p. 226)
• 9.4.8 Citations and Violations (p. 227)
• 9.4.9 Root-Cause Evaluations (p. 227)
• 9.4.10 Injuries (p. 228)
• 9.4.11 Rate of Written CMs (p. 228)
• 9.4.12 Overdue CM Backlog (p. 229)
• 9.4.13 Overdue PM Backlog (p. 229)
• 9.5 Weighting Factors (p. 230)
• 9.6 Performance Calculations (p. 231)
• 9.7 Performance Graph (p. 235)
• 9.8 Performance Graph by System (p. 237)
• 9.9 A Final Caution (p. 239)
• 9.10 Benchmarking (p. 239)
• 9.11 More About Expected Performance Rates (p. 241)
• 9.12 Avoid Reliability Complacency (p. 241)
• 9.13 How to Maintain Your Reliability Performance (p. 242)
• 9.14 Chapter Summary (p. 246)
• Chapter 10 RCM Implementation Made Simple-Epilogue (p. 249)
• 10.1 RCM as a Plant Culture (p. 249)
• 10.2 A Step-by-Step Review of the Process (p. 251)
• 10.2.1 Select an RCM Point of Contact (p. 251)
• 10.2.2 Review the Reasons for RCM Program Failures (p. 255)
• 10.2.3 Understand the Concepts (p. 255)
• 10.2.4 Define Your Asset Reliability Criteria (p. 255)
• 10.2.5 Establish Your Alphanumeric Equipment Database (p. 256)
• 10.2.6 Analyze Each Component Function in the COFA Logic Tree (p. 256)
• 10.2.7 Analyze Each Component Function in the Potentially Critical Guideline (p. 257)
• 10.2.8 Analyze Each Component Function in the Economically Significant Guideline (p. 257)
• 10.2.9 Enter All Data in the COFA Worksheet (p. 258)
• 10.2.10 Classify Each Component (p. 258)
• 10.2.11 Analyze All Classified Components Except Run-to-Failure Components in the PM Task Selection Logic Tree (p. 258)
• 10.2.12 Document All Tasks and Periodicities on the PM Task Worksheet (p. 258)
• 10.2.13 Analyze Instruments in the Instrument Logic Tree (p. 259)
• 10.2.14 Develop Your RCM Living Program (p. 259)
• 10.2.15 Establish Monitoring and Trending Program Metrics (p. 260)
• 10.2.16 Establish Your Expected Performance Rate (p. 260)
• 10.2.17 Establish Your Actual Performance Rate (p. 261)
• 10.2.18 Establish Your Trend Graphs (p. 261)
• 10.2.19 Maintain Continued Vigilance Over Your Program (p. 261)
• 10.3 Taking Command of Your Own Ship (p. 262)
• Glossary (p. 265)
• Bibliography (p. 285)
• Index (p. 287)

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Neil Bloom received his Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Miami, where he also minored in economics. He has a unique depth of experience as a practitioner of RCM and preventive maintenance programs having worked in close association for over 30 years with the two leading-edge federal agencies most responsible for reliability and safety, namely the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). His RCM experience in commercial aviation and nuclear power has been in both Engineering and Maintenance, where the RCM process meets its most formidable challenges for successful implementation. RCM can be a powerful reliability tool but unfortunately, and unjustly, it has become what is greatly perceived as a complex, difficult, and costly undertaking. As a result, the author has introduced innovative concepts allowing the classical RCM process to reach a new plateau for the average layperson, thusly making the entire process less daunting, more straightforward and simpler. He explains what can and what cannot be done - what works and what doesn't work - he understands where the pitfalls are and how to avoid them. Mr. Bloom has been a guest speaker on RCM at national and international conferences including the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the American Nuclear Society (ANS), the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) which is operated by the University of Chicago for the Department of Energy (DOE), the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria.