Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

A pioneer in evolutionary game theory looks at selfishness and cooperation

How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work. The Calculus of Selfishness looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation.

Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions.

Exploring basic strategic interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps, The Calculus of Selfishness analyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature--selfishness--can lead to cooperation.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Preface (p. vii)
• 1 Introduction: Social Traps and Simple Games (p. 1)
• 2 Game Dynamics and Social Learning (p. 25)
• 3 Direct Reciprocity: The Role of Repetition (p. 49)
• 4 Indirect Reciprocity: The Role of Reputation (p. 82)
• 5 Fairness and Trust: The Power of Incentives (p. 104)
• 6 Public Goods and Joint Efforts: Between Freedom and Enforcement (p. 123)
• 7 Cooperation in Structured Populations (p. 145)
• References (p. 55)
• Index (p. 169)

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

In The Calculus of Selfishness, Sigmund (mathematics, Univ. of Vienna, Austria; Games of Life, CH, May'94, 31-4904; coauthor with J. Hofbauer, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, 1998) introduces the reader to a large body of research on mathematical modeling of the evolution of cooperative behavior in repeated games. Using mathematical models, the author shows that in repeated games, such as the famous prisoner's dilemma, strategies involving cooperation with an opponent can actually be advantageous. Through an evolutionary process, such cooperative strategies can eventually become predominant within a population of competitors. This is a topic with important applications in both the life sciences and the social sciences. The reader will require mathematical background in linear algebra and systems of ordinary differential equations to understand the text. Although Sigmund claims in the preface that this book is aimed at undergraduate students in economics, psychology, and biology, the required mathematics background is simply beyond most undergraduates in these disciplines. The book is more likely to be accessible to mathematically inclined graduate students and researchers working in these areas. Summing Up: Recommended. Academic libraries serving graduate students and above. B. Borchers New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Karl Sigmund is professor of mathematics at the University of Vienna. He is the author of Games of Life (Penguin), coauthor of Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, and a contributor to Nature and Science.