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The financial crisis : who is to blame? / Howard Davies.

By: Davies, H. (Howard), 1951-.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cambridge, MA.: Polity Press, c2010Description: vi, 229 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9780745651644; 074565164X.Subject(s): Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 | Bank failures -- United States | Finance, Public | Banking law -- United States | Economic policy | Intervention (Federal government) -- United States | International economic relations | Credit ratings -- United States | Finance -- Law and legislation | Off balance sheet financing -- United States | Economics | Subprime mortgage loans -- United States | Economics | Economic & financial crises & disastersDDC classification: 330 DAV Subject: "There is still no consensus on who or what caused the financial crisis which engulfed the world, beginning in the summer of 2007. A huge number of suspects have been identified, from greedy investment bankers, through feckless borrowers, dilatory regulators and myopic central bankers to violent video games and high levels of testosterone among the denizens of trading floors. There is not even agreement on whether the crisis shows a need for more government intervention in markets, or less: some maintain that government encouragement of home ownership lay at the heart of the problem in the US, in particular. In The Financial Crisis Howard Davies charts a course through these arguments, and the evidence advanced for each of them. The reader can thereby assess the weight to be attached to each, and the likely effectiveness of the remedies under development."- Publisher description.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Barcode
General lending MTU Kerry North Campus Library Ground Floor Main 330 DAV (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 38888000650121
Total holds: 0

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

There is still no consensus on who or what caused the financial crisis which engulfed the world, beginning in the summer of 2007.

A huge number of suspects have been identified, from greedy investment bankers, through feckless borrowers, dilatory regulators and myopic central bankers to violent video games and high levels of testosterone among the denizens of trading floors. There is not even agreement on whether the crisis shows a need for more government intervention in markets, or less: some maintain that government encouragement of home ownership lay at the heart of the problem in the US, in particular.

In The Financial Crisis Howard Davies charts a course through these arguments, and the evidence advanced for each of them. The reader can thereby assess the weight to be attached to each, and the likely effectiveness of the remedies under development.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

"There is still no consensus on who or what caused the financial crisis which engulfed the world, beginning in the summer of 2007. A huge number of suspects have been identified, from greedy investment bankers, through feckless borrowers, dilatory regulators and myopic central bankers to violent video games and high levels of testosterone among the denizens of trading floors. There is not even agreement on whether the crisis shows a need for more government intervention in markets, or less: some maintain that government encouragement of home ownership lay at the heart of the problem in the US, in particular. In The Financial Crisis Howard Davies charts a course through these arguments, and the evidence advanced for each of them. The reader can thereby assess the weight to be attached to each, and the likely effectiveness of the remedies under development."- Publisher description.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

  • Introduction
  • A The Big Picture
  • 1 Frankenstein's monster: The end of Laissez-faire capitalism
  • 2 The rich get richer - the poor borrow
  • 3 The savings glut - global imbalances
  • 4 Too loose for too long - US monetary policy
  • B The Trigger
  • 5 Minsky's Moment
  • 6 The sub-prime collapse - a failure of government?
  • C The Failures of Regulation
  • 7 A capital shortage
  • 8 Procyclicality
  • 9 The Canary in the Coal Mine: off-balance sheet vehicles
  • 10 The taxi at the station: liquidity
  • 11 The Blind Mind and The Elephant: US Regulation
  • 12 SEC- RIP?
  • 13 Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction: Derivatives
  • 14 Federal Mortgage Regulation
  • 15 Casino banking: the end of the Glass-Steagall Act
  • 16 Too big to fail
  • 17 Lighting the Touchpaper: Light touch regulation
  • 18 There were three people in the marriage: UK regulation
  • 19 Lack of Coordination
  • 20 Paradise lost: offshore centres
  • D Accountants, auditors and rating agencies
  • 21 Shoot the Messenger: fair value accounting
  • 22 Tunnel Vision: the auditors
  • 23 Conflicts of interest: credit rating agencies
  • E Financial Firms and Markets
  • 24 Breaking the chain: originate to distribute
  • 25 Too complex to trade: derivatives
  • 26 Disaster Myopia: risk management
  • 27 The Roach Motel: corporate governance
  • 28 Blankfein's bonus: pay and incentives
  • 29 The Vampire Squid
  • 30 A plague of locusts: hedge funds
  • 31 Short Selling
  • F Economics and Finance Theory
  • 32 The death of economics
  • 33 Inefficient markets
  • 34 An ethics-free zone: business schools
  • G Wild Cards
  • 35 The watchdog didn't bark: the media
  • 36 Greed is bad
  • 37 Lara Croft: video games
  • 38 Hormones and Finally
  • 39 A combustible mixture

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

"Get me a one-handed economist" was President Truman's plea, having tired of being told, "On the one hand, on the other hand" (OTOH, OTOH). Davies (director, London School of Economics, with a distinguished career in both the UK government and private sectors) conforms to the OTOH, OTOH model, but in a most positive way. In myriad brief chapters, Davies discusses the many conflicting views of the causes of the recent financial crisis. Were the low interest rates during 2003-04 a result of world economic conditions or an engineered US monetary policy? Were hedge funds and their short-selling significant contributors to the crisis? Did the unwieldy US regulatory structure, with diffused responsibility among various federal agencies, make a difference? Would the presence of the Volcker Rule, now enshrined in US financial regulation, have prevented the meltdown? How about US government-sponsored entities, mark-to-market accounting rules, and oversized Wall Street bonuses? And so on for 38 chapters. Davies's work will be of immense value to those who value inquisitiveness and an open mind, i.e., serious students, be they professionals or students. They will also benefit from the brief chapter-end bibliographies. This reviewer has already strongly recommended this book to his financial crises course undergraduate students. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through professionals. J. Prager New York University

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Howard Davies is the director of the London School of Economics and Political Science.